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CHAPTER 14 
Labor Relations 
LAWRENCE M. KEARNS 
A. FEDERAL DECISIONS 
§14.1. Breach of no-strike agreement. A major development in 
labor law during the 1962 SURVEY year was a group of United States 
Supreme Court decisions involving various aspects of the problem of 
remedies for breach of a union's no-strike agreement. In Drake Bak-
eries, Inc. v. Local 50, American Bakery "" Confectionery Workers In-
ternational, AFL-CIO,l it was held that when the collective bargaining 
agreement has a broad arbitration clause,2 the employer's action for 
damages against the union in the federal district court under Section 
301 of the Taft-Hartley ActS for violation of the no-strike clause of 
the agreement4 may be stayed, since the employer's damage claim was 
arbitrable.1I On the facts of this case, the Court thus ruled that ar-
bitration, rather than a court, was "the forum it agreed to use for 
processing its strike damage claims." On the same day the Court held 
in Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining CO.6 that the union there was not en-
LAWRENCE M. KEARNS is a partner in the firm of Morgan, Brown, Kearns &: Joy, 
Boston. He is co-author (with Donald A. Shaw) of Labor Relations Guide for Massa-
chusetts (1950 with 1958 Supp.). 
§14.1. 1370 V.S. 254, 82 Sup_ Ct. 1346, 8 L. Ed. 2d 474 (1962). 
2 The contract provided: "The parties agree that they will promptly attempt to 
adjust all complaints, disputes or grievances arising between them involving ques-
tions of interpretation or application of any clause or matter covered by this con-
tract or any act or conduct or relation between the parties hereto, directly or in-
directly." 
a 29 V.S.C. §§14l-l97 (1958). 
4 The no-strike clause read: "There shall be no strike, boycott interruption of 
work, stoppage, temporary walk-out or lock-out for any reason during the terms of 
this contract except that if either party shall fail to abide by the decision of the 
Arbitrator, after receipt of such decision under Article 6 of this contract, then the 
other party shall not be bound by this provision." 
1\ By way of qualification the Court stated: "We do not decide in this case that 
in no circumstances would a strike in violation of the no-strike clause contained in 
this or other contracts entitle the employer to rescind or abandon the entire con-
tract or to declare its promise to arbitrate forever discharged or to refuse to arbi-
trate its damage claims against the union." 370 V.S. 254, 265, 82 Sup. Ct. 1346. 1353. 
8 L. Ed. 2d 474. 482 (1962). Furthermore the Court distinguished some of the con-
trary decisions of the Courts of Appeals of the various circuits on the grounds that 
they involved "far more narrowly drawn arbitration clauses than that which is in-
volved here." 370 V.S. at 264, 82 Sup. Ct. at 1352. 8 L. Ed. 2d at 481. 
6370 V.S. 238. 82 Sup. Ct. 1318. 8 L. Ed. 2d 462 (1962). 
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titled to a stay of a federal district court damage action brought by 
the employer under Section 301 for breach of a no-strike agreement, 
because the particular collective bargaining agreement involved did 
not require the employer to arbitrate its damage claim.7 The griev-
ance and arbitration clause in the agreement specifically provided that 
local arbitration boards "shall consider only individual or local em-
ployee or local committee grievances arising under the application of 
the currently existing agreement." The Court noted, "There is not a 
word in the grievance and arbitration article providing for the sub-
mission of grievances by the company." The obvious result of these 
two decisions will be further litigation involving the issue whether 
particular agreements and factual situations bring specific cases within 
Drake Bakeries or Atkinson. 
The third case decided January 18, 1962, was Sinclair Refining Co. 
v. Atkinson,8 which involved a separate aspect of the same litigation 
involving the parties above. The Supreme Court in a 5-to-3 decision 
resolved the controversial question whether a federal court in a Sec-
tion 301 suit may grant to an employer injunctive relief against a 
union for violation of a no-strike agreement. The majority held that 
the Norris-LaGuardia Actll bars federal courts from granting such re-
lief. Mr. Justice Brennan, in a vigorous dissenting opinion, discussed 
the as-yet-unanswered question10 of the effect of the majority'S holding 
on suits for injunctions in state courts for breach of no-strike agree-
ments. He stated: 
We have held that uniform doctrines of federal labor law are 
to be fashioned judicially in suits brought under §301, Textile 
Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448; that actions based on col-
lective agreements remain cognizable in state as well as federal 
courts, Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502; and that state 
7 The no-strike clause read: "There shall be no strikes ... (1) for any cause 
which is or may be the subject of a grievance ... or (2) for any cause except 
upon written notice by the Union to the Employer." 
81170 U.S. 195.82 Sup. Ct. 11128.8 L. Ed. 2d 440 (1962). 
1129 U.S.C. §§101-1l5 (1958). 
10 Footnote 8 of the Supreme Court's opinion in Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Court-
ney. 1168 U.S. 502. 514. 82 Sup. Ct. 519. 526.7 L. Ed. 2d 4811. 491 (1962). reads in part as 
follows: "In the course of argument at the Bar two questions were discussed which 
are not involved in this case. and upon which we expressly refrain from intimating 
any view-whether the Norris-LaGuardia Act might be applicable to a suit brought 
in a state court for violation of a contract made by a labor organization. and 
whether there might be impediments to the free removal to a federal court of such 
a suit. The relation of the Norris-LaGuardia Act to state courts applying federal 
labor law has never been decided by this Court. See McCarroll v. Los Angeles 
County Dist. Council of Carpenters. 49 Cal. 2d 45.1115 P.2d 1122." 
In the McCarroll case. the California court upheld the issuance of an injunction. 
holding that Norris-LaGuardia was not applicable to state court injunction suits. 
McCarroll has been cited by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Courtney 
v. Charles Dowd Box Co .• 1141 Mass. 11117. 11119. 169 N.E.2d 885. 887 (1960); Karcz v. 
Luther Manufacturing Co .• 11118 Mass. 11111. 1117. 155 N.E.2d 441. 444 (1959). 
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courts must apply federal law in such actions, Teamsters Local v. 
Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95. 
The question arises whether today's prohibition of injunctive 
relief is to be carried over to state courts as a part of the federal 
law governing collective agreements. If so, §301, a provision 
plainly designed to enhance the responsibility of unions to their 
contracts, will have had opposite effect of depriving employers of 
a state remedy they enjoyed prior to its enactment. 
On the other hand if, as today's literal reading suggests and as 
a leading state decision holds, States remain free to apply their 
injunctive remedies against concerted activities in breach of con-
tract, the development of a uniform body of federal contract law 
is in for hard times. So long as state courts remain free to grant 
the injunctions unavailable in federal courts, suits seeking relief 
against concerted activities in breach of contract will be channeled 
to the States whenever possible. Ironically, state rather than fed-
eral courts will be the preferred instruments to protect the in-
tegrity of the arbitration process, which Lincoln Mills and the 
Steelworkers decisions forged into a kingpin of federal labor 
policy. Enunciation of uniform doctrines applicable in such cases 
will be severely impeded. Moreover, the type of relief available 
in a particular instance will turn on fortuities of locale and sus-
ceptibility to process - depending upon which States have anti-
injunction statutes and how they construe them. 
I have not overlooked the possibility that removal of the state 
suit to the federal court might provide the answer to these diffi-
culties. But if §4 is to be read literally, removal will not be al-
lowed. And if it is allowed, the result once again is that §301 will 
have had the strange consequence of taking away a contract 
remedy available before its enactment.11 
Another important case involving no-strike agreements was Local 
174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour CO.12 Here the collective bargaining 
agreement did not contain a no-strike clause but included an arbitra-
tion clause, and the union struck over a grievance that was subject 
to arbitration. The Court held that the strike was a violation of the 
collective bargaining agreement. The Court stated the rule as "a 
strike to settle a dispute which a collective bargaining agreement 
provides shall be settled exclusively and finally by compulsory arbi-
tration constitutes a violation of the agreement." 13 The Court spe-
cifically approved this doctrine of an implied no-strike clause as previ-
ously held by a number of the circuit courts including the decision 
of the First Circuit in the Mead case,14 as well as the NLRB's same 
11 370 U.S. 195, 215, 226·227, 82 Sup. Ct. 1328, 1339, 1344-1345, 8 L. Ed. 2d 440, 
453,459·460 (1962). 
12 369 U.S. 95, 82 Sup. Ct. 571, 7 L. Ed. 2d 593 (1962). 
13 The arbitration clause did provide that "during such arbitration, there shall 
be no suspension of work." 
14 Local 25, Teamsters Union v. W. L. Mead, Inc., 230 F.2d 576 (1st Cir. 1956). 
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holding.lIl The Lucas Flour case arose in a state court, and the Su-
preme Court also held that state courts must apply federal law in any 
action involving enforcement of collective bargaining agreements. 
This is because Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act as interpreted in 
the Lincoln Mills decision requires the federal courts to fashion "from 
the policy of our national labor laws a body of federal law for the 
enforcement of collective bargaining agreements," and "substantive 
principles of federal labor law must be paramount in the area covered 
by the statute." Uniform law is necessary to prevent "the possibility 
of conflicting substantive interpretation [of the collective bargaining 
agreement] under competing legal systems." 
§14.2. Federal pre-emption. The doctrine of federal pre-emption 
where an activity is "arguably" protected by Section 7 or prohibited 
by Section 8 of the National Labor Relations Actl was applied by 
the Supreme Court of the United States in two rather unusual cases. 
In one case2 the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Supreme 
Court of Ohio, which had affirmed the lower court of that state in 
denying relief (in a habeas corpus proceeding) to a union lawyer who 
had been held in contempt of court for advising union officials to 
continue picketing that had been enjoined by the state court. The 
employer being picketed was engaged in interstate commerce, an un-
fair labor practice charge involving the same dispute was pending 
before the NLRB, and the picketing was peaceful. The Supreme 
Court held that the Ohio court had erred constitutionally in refusing 
to grant the lawyer a hearing he had requested on the issue whether 
the state court lacked jurisdiction because of federal pre-emption. 
In the second caseS the Minnesota state court had enjoined picket-
ing by the Marine Engineers Union. If the union were subject to the 
jurisdiction of the NLRB, the picketing was arguably unlawful under 
Section 8(b) of the NLRA. The state court based its assumption of 
jurisdiction on a finding that the particular union involved did not 
come within the statutory definition of a labor organization as an 
"employee" representative because it was made up exclusively of per-
sonnel who were "supervisors" as defined in the NLRA 4 and the act 
excludes supervisors from the definition of "employees." 5 The United 
State Supreme Court held that the state court had no jurisdiction 
because the issue whether the union was subject to the NLRA was 
arguable6 and this issue of jurisdiction was for the NLRB and not 
the state court to determine. 
15 W. L. Mead, Inc., 113 N.L.R.B. 1040 (1955). 
§14.2. 129 U.S.C. §§157, 158 (1958); Garner v. Teamsters Local 776, 346 U.S. 
485, 74 Sup. Ct. 161, 98 L. Ed. 228 (1953); San Diego Building Trades Council v. 
Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 79 Sup. Ct. 773, 3 L. Ed. 2d 775 (1959). 
2 In re Green, 369 U.S. 689, 82 Sup. Ct. 1114,8 L. Ed. 2d 198 (1962). 
3 Marine Engineers Beneficial Assn. v. Interlake Steamship Co., 370 U.s. 173, 82 
Sup. Ct. 1237,8 L. Ed. 2d 418 (1962). 
429 U .S.C. §152(11) (1958). 
5 Id. §152(3). 
8Id. §152(5). 
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§14.3. Federal actions to enforce arbitration. The First Circuit 
Court of Appeals decided two cases during the 1962 SURVEY year in-
volving actions by unions to compel arbitration. In one,l the issue 
sought to be arbitrated was whether the employer had violated its 
collective bargaining agreement by contracting out performance of 
office janitorial services. There was no provision in the agreement 
as to subcontracting. The arbitration clause covered interpretation, 
application or claimed violation of the agreement, and there was a 
specific provision in the agreement to the effect that 
if either party shall advice the Association that the grievance 
desired to be arbitrated does not, in its opinion, raise an arbitra-
ble issue . . . [the arbitrator shall be appointed] only after a 
final judgment of a Court has determined that the grievance upon 
which the arbitration has been requested raises an arbitrable issue 
or issues. 
The decree of the district court compelling arbitration was affirmed.2 
In a concurring opinion, Judge Aldrich pointed out that the parties 
may provide that arbitration will depend upon the court's finding of 
merit in the claim sought to be arbitrated, but the quoted clause did 
not do that. "The question for us is simply whether the matter here 
sought to be arbitrated was within the arbitration clause." 8 
In the second case,4 the First Circuit reversed the judgment of the 
district court ordering arbitration. Here, the Machinists Union sought 
arbitration of a dispute as to whether the employer violated the col-
lective bargaining agreement by not giving lAM certain work being 
performed by IBEW employees who were under another agreement 
with the company. lAM claimed the work was within its bargaining 
unit. IBEW was permitted to intervene. The Circuit Court appeared 
§14.3 1 Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Local Lodge No. 1790 of District 38, In-
ternational Assn. of Machinists, AFL-CIO, 304 F.2d 449 (Ist Cir. 1962). 
2 Chief Judge Woodbury and Judge Hartigan joined in a per curiam decision of 
one sentence: "We see no substantial distinction between the case at bar and United 
Steelworkers of America v. Warrior &: Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 80 S. Ct. 
1347,4 L. Ed. 2d 1409 (1960)." 
8304 F.2d 449, 450 (1st Cir. 1962). Judge Aldrich continued: "The issue of con-
tracting out is normally arbitrable; it is not necessary that there be a provision 
specifically dealing with it. Cf. Town &: Country Mfg. Co., Inc., 136 N.L.R.B. No. 
111 (4/13/62). It is not necessary to decide here, and I do not understand that the 
court does decide, how far arbitrability would extend in case of conflicting claims 
between unions for the same employment." Ibid. In respect to this latter sentence, 
the Westinghouse case was decided May 3, 1962, the same day the Raytheon case was 
argued. As to the first sentence, one could fairly say that up until the last few 
years violent exception would be taken by management attorneys to the statement 
that the issue of contracting out "is normally arbitrable." And while the tendency 
is in that direction, particularly since the Warrior case, there might still be some 
who would question whether that issue is "normally" arbitrable. 
4 Local No. 1505 International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. Local Lodge 
No. 1836 of District 38 of International Assn. of Machinists, 304 F.2d 365 (1st Cir. 
1962). 
5
Kearns: Chapter 14: Labor Relations
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1962
176 1962 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §14.4 
to say that since the dispute involved a matter of representation, or 
a jurisdictional dispute between unions, the jurisdiction of the NLRB 
is exclusive in the sense of pre-emption although this was a Section 
301 suit in federal court and not a state court proceeding. On re-
hearing, the Circuit Court recognized that pre-emption "as such" does 
not apply to federal actions under Section 301,5 but still stated that 
the NLRB has exclusive jurisdiction. The board itself has construed 
its "exclusive" jurisdiction to mean that private agreements and arbi-
tration decisions are not binding upon the board. But there is con-
siderable doubt whether parties are precluded from agreeing by con-
tract to define the scope of the certification or to agree to arbitrate 
such an issue.6 The Supreme Court has granted certiorari.T 
§14.4. Miscellaneous federal decisions. Although the Court of Ap-
peals for the First Circuit and the Federal District Court for Massa-
chusetts had a number of labor cases before them during the 1962 
SURVEY year in addition to those discussed above, most involved no 
major developments. Three cases do deserve special mention.1 
In NLRB v. Thayer, Inc.,2 the district court granted the board's 
application for an administrative subpoena duces tecum for books 
and records of two Massachusetts corporations and an individual Mas-
sachusetts resident to determine whether the Massachusetts corpora-
tions and a Virginia corporation were a single enterprise. The NLRB 
had found the Virginia corporation guilty of unfair labor practices. 
The Virginia corporation claimed it had dissolved and could no longer 
obey a reinstatement order. It was the board's purpose to make the 
Massachusetts corporation and individual resident of Massachusetts 
1\ Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour, 1169 U.S. 95, 82 Sup. Ct. 571, 7 L. Ed. 2d 5911 
(1962). 
6 The Circuit Court stated flatly: "A union by contract with an employer cannot 
define the scope of its certification; that is the Board's function." It may be noted 
that even if this "cannot" be done legally, it is in fact often done by employers and 
unions when they add classifications or groups to, or remove them from, an existing 
unit. Furthermore, there is nothing in the NLRA that requires that a bargaining 
agent be certified by the board. The views of the parties and past practice are 
among the factors the board may consider in its determination of the appropri-
ateness of the unit. While the board is not bound by the agreement of the parties, 
it may give it weight, and query if the agreement is "unlawful" in any sense other 
than it is ineffective if the board decides the agreed-upon unit is not appropriate. 
T Certiorari granted Nov. 19, 1962, Docket No. 419, 811 Sup. Ct. 255, 9 L. Ed. 2d 
169 (1962). The Circuit Court's decision is commented on in Sovern, Section 1101 
and the Primary Jurisdiction of the NLRB, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 528, 574-577 (19611). 
§14.4. lOne interesting development in the First Circuit is that court's refusal 
to sustain the board's findings of "surveillance" as Section 8(a}(I} violations in two 
cases. In NLRB v. Davidson Rubber Co., 1105 F.2d 166 (1st Cir. 1962), the board 
had found unlawful surveillance where a supervisor was sitting in a chair in his 
living room and looking next door while a union meeting was going on. In NLRB 
v. Whitelight Products Division of White Metal Rolling & Stamping Corp., 298 
F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1962), the court held that the manager's casual driving by a union 
meeting being held on a street where it was natural for him to be was not surveil-
lance and the board's finding was sotnething "blown up out of proportion." 
2 NLRB v. Thayer, Inc., 201 F, Supp, 602 (D, Mass. 1962). 
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responsible for remedying the unfair labor practices of the Virginia 
corporation. S 
In NLRB v. Trancoa Chemical Corp.,4 the First Circuit denied the 
NLRB's petition for enforcement and set aside the board's order di-
recting the employer to bargain collectively on the grounds that the 
union had circulated misleading literature in the election campaign 
prior to its certification. The court in a strongly worded decision 
sharply disagreed with the board's long-standing view that a union's 
election campaign statements are not a basis for overturning an elec-
tion unless they involve "forgery or other campaign trickery." The 
First Circuit followed the Fifth Circuit in stating the rule that "it is 
sufficiently likely that it cannot be told whether they [the employees] 
were or were not" misled by the misrepresentation rather than that 
they were necessarily misled. 
In NLRB v. Beneventol; the First Circuit remanded the case to the 
board for further proceedings on the grounds that there were no clear 
findings of fact based upon legally sufficient evidence to support the 
board's assertion of jurisdiction. The respondents were a father and 
son engaged in a local sand and gravel business. The court held that 
the board may not automatically apply its jurisdictional standards of 
dollar values of "outflow or inflow" but must determine "as a matter 
of fact in each case as it arises" the impact, if any, of a purely intra-
state activity upon interstate commerce. 
B. MASSACHUSETTS DECISIONS 
§14.5. Injunction in MTA strike. Certainly the most widely pub-
licized labor decision in Massachusetts during the 1962 SURVEY year 
was Hansen v. Commonwealth,1 in which the Supreme Judicial Court 
affirmed the Superior Court judgments for contempt involving eight 
employees of the Metropolitan Transit Authority who had been found 
to have willfully violated a temporary restraining order enjoining an 
MT A strike by refusing to perform services or assignments pursuant 
to the authority'S 1962 spring schedule. The case also was noteworthy 
for the expeditiousness of the proceedings.2 
S The court held that the decision in NLRB v. Deena Artware, Inc., 361 U.S. 398, 
80 Sup. Ct. 441, 4 L. Ed. 2d 400 (1960), was controlling. 
4303 F.2d 456 (1st Cir. 1962). 
I) 297 F.2d 873 (1st Cir. 1961). On remand, the NLRB affirmed its original deci-
sion that it had jurisdiction on the ground that the sand and gravel operations af-
fected interstate commerce. The board disagreed with the First Circuit's views as 
to the criteria controlling the board's jurisdiction. M. Benevento Sand & Gravel Co., 
138 N.L.R.B. No.9, Aug. 13, 1962. Subsequently the United States Supreme Court, 
in a per curiam decision after the close of the 1962 SURVEY year, appears to adopt 
the views of the board. NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., Jan. 7, 1963, reversing 
the Second Circuit. 83 Sup. Ct. 312, 9 L. Ed_ 2d 279 (1963), rev'g, 297 F.2d 94 (2d 
Cir. 1961). 
§14.5. 11962 Mass. Adv. Sh. 637, 181 N.E.2d 843. 
2 The bill of complaint was filed March 29 on the basis of the union's threat to 
• strike March 31. A short order of notice issued returnable on March 30. At an ex 
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The temporary restraining order was issued by a single justice of the 
Superior Court without compliance with the procedural requirements 
of the Anti-Injunction Act.S The trial judge held that neither that 
act nor the statute4 requiring the convening of a three-judge court in 
labor dispute cases applied. The Supreme Judicial Court agreed. 
The statute creating the MT A I) made it "a body politic and corporate 
and a political subdivision of the Commonwealth." The Court held 
that the MT A employees are public employees and that neither the 
Anti-Injunction Act nor the three-judge statute applies to threatened 
strikes by public employees.6 The Court also held that there was no 
merit to the contention of the petitioners (the eight employees held 
in contempt) that they were not parties to the proceeding at the time 
the temporary restraining order was issued and hence could not be 
affected by it. The allegations in the complaint as to the representa-
tive capacity of the eleven officers and members who were named as 
parties defendant were held to be sufficient to bring the members of 
the union before the court on the theory of a class suit.7 
§14.6. Enforcement of arbitration award. In Morceau v. Gould-
National Batteries, Inc.,! the statement of the issues for arbitration 
was a complicated one. It appeared that the employees of Company A 
went on strike the day. Company B purchased Company A. Four 
parte hearing on March 30, the temporary restraining order was issued. On March 
31 the MT A filed the petition for contempt which was heard on April 9 and 10. On 
April 11 the eight employees were adjudged to be in contempt and were sentenced 
to jail. On April 12 the petition for writ of error was brought seeking to have 
the judgments for contempt set aside. The single justice, after hearing, reported 
the case to the full bench. The case was argued April 17, and the decision was 
handed down April 20. The judge who had sentenced the eight to jail released 
them the day before Easter, April 21, after their apologies in open court. The 
MTA strike over the issues of the spring schedules began March 31, 1962. Service 
was disrupted for two days. The MT A provides public transit service in the met-
ropolitan Boston area. On March 31, 1962, the legislature passed an act permit-
ting seizure of the MTA for 45 days where there is a strike in violation of an in-
junction (Acts of 1962. c. 307), and the Governor seized the MTA pursuant to this 
act. 
S G.L., c. 214, §9A. 
4 Id., c. 212, §30. 
Ii Acts of 1947, c. 544. 
6 Since the Court held that the Superior Court had jurisdiction to issue the tem-
porary restraining order, it did not reach the question whether the employees could 
have been held in contempt if the Superior Court had erred in its rulings on the 
non-application of the labor dispute statutes. The Court referred without com-
ment to United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258, 289-295. 
67 Sup. Ct. 677. 693-697. 91 L. Ed. 884. 910-914 (1947), which held that individuals 
who violated a void decree are still subject to contempt. In this connection, see In 
re Green, 369 U.S. 689, 82 Sup. Ct. 1114, 8 L. Ed. 2d 198 (1962), noted in §14.2 supra 
(decided after the Hansen case). in which the same doubt is cast on the Mine Work-
ers decision. 
7 Donahue v. Kenney, 327 Mass. 409. 99 N.E.2d 155 (1951); Pickett v. Walsh. 1~2 
Mass. 572. 590, 78 N.E. 753, 761 (1906). 
§14.6. 11962 Mass. Adv. Sh. 527. 181 N.E.2d 664. 
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months later the strike ended with a stipulation that Company B 
would offer employment to the employees of Company A, with certain 
provisions as to seniority, and the parties also entered into a separate 
collective bargaining agreement. Company B did hire a number of 
these employees but refused to hire two employees who had only pro-
bationary status with Company A. There was a basis for arguing that 
Company B was not required to offer employment to probationary 
employees. There was also a basis for arguing that a provision pro-
hibiting discrimination because of union activities applied to all 
former employees. The arbitrator was asked in substance (1) if the 
union had the right to represent these two probationary employees 
under the collective bargaining agreement, (2) if so, did the company 
violate the stipulation as to hiring, and (3) what the remedy should be. 
The arbitrator found in the affirmative on issues (1) and (2), ordered 
the company to offer employment to one of the individuals with back 
pay, less earnings elsewhere, and dismissed the grievance of the other 
individual. In his written decision the arbitrator stated that the right 
of the union to represent the individuals must originate in the stipula-
tion for offering employment, and not the collective bargaining agree-
ment, since the individuals had never been employees of Company B. 
With considerable logic, the Superior Court judge concluded that 
since issue (1) referred only to the collective bargaining agreement 
and not the stipulation, the arbitrator did not conform to his author-
ity under the submission and the award was invalid. The Supreme 
Judicial Court reversed. 
The Court held that the wording of issue (1) in referring to "the 
collective bargaining agreement" could be construed to include the 
stipulation, and it was inconsequential that the arbitrator did not 
base his opinion on such an implication.2 It appears the arbitrator 
relied largely on his finding that there was discrimination because 
of union activities. 
The significance of this decision is that the Massachusetts Court has 
now followed the spirit of the United States Supreme Court's famous 
trilogy3 of 1960, which takes an extremely broad view of an arbitrator's 
authority in labor arbitration cases and a narrow view of a court's role.4 
2 The Court noted its concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts in Section 301 
suits under Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502,82 Sup. Ct. 519, 7 L. Ed. 
2d 483 (1962), afJ'g 341 Mass. 337, 169 N.E.2d 885 (1960), and stated that its function 
is to participate in the fashioning of a body of federal law for the enforcement of 
agreements within the ambit of Section 301. 
S United Steelworkers of America v. American Manufacturing Co., 363 U.s. 564, 
80 Sup. Ct. 1343, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1403 (1960); United Steelworkers of America v. War-
rior Be Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 80 Sup. Ct. 1347,4 L. Ed. 2d 1409 (1960); 
United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel Be Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 80 
Sup. Ct. 1358, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1424 (1960). See 1960 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §14.l. See 
also 2 B.C. Ind. Be Comm. L. Rev. 359, which the Massachusetts Court cited in its 
opinion. 
4 "The function of the court in viewing decisions of arbitrators in this field is 
limited to determining whether the arbitrator has acted within the scope of the 
reference." 1962 Mass. Adv. Sh. 527, 530,181 N.E.2d 664, 667. 
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When the question is one of the arbitrator's authority or jurisdiction, 
i.e., an issue of arbitrability, it may fairly be inferred from the language 
in this decision that the arbitrator's ruling as to his own jurisdiction 
will be upheld if any basis can be found for supporting it.1i Although 
this case was not governed by the 1959 Massachusetts statute6 on labor 
arbitration, there is no reason to believe the Court would adopt a 
different approach under that statute. 
§14.7. Employment security. In 1958 the Employment Security 
Law was amended to change the disqualification for voluntary quit-
ting of employment from leaving "voluntarily without good cause 
attributable to the employing unit or its agent" to leaving "voluntarily 
without good cause." In Raytheon Co. v. Director of Division of Em-
ployment Security} there were three claimants for benefits who were 
married women and who had left employment with Raytheon for the 
purpose of joining or living with their husbands who were located 
outside Massachusetts. The Director of the Division, the Board of 
Review and the district court all held the three women entitled to 
benefits. The question presented on appeal was whether leaving em-
ployment to join one's husband in another state constitutes leaving 
"voluntarily without good cause" within the meaning of the statute. 
The Court held that such moving may constitute good cause, depend-
ing upon the circumstances, but does not constitute good cause per se. 
The Court remanded the case because "the meager facts here, without 
more, do not justify the conclusion that the claimants left their em-
ployment with 'good cause.''' The presence of necessity, of legal duty, 
of family obligations or other overpowering circumstances was not 
shown.2 
§14.8. Miscellaneous decisions. In Bosse v. Leonard "" Barrow 
Shoe Co.,1 it was held that the Superior Court judge did not err in 
denying leave to file a bill of review of an injunction against picketing 
Ii An interesting point in the Court's opinion is that the company's argument to 
the effect that the form of issue No. I so strongly favored its position of non-
arbitrability is turned around by the Court as an argument against it. The Court 
says that the company's construction of the issue "would render the arbitration sub-
stantially meaningless." The Court quotes the United States Supreme Court in the 
Warrior case, 363 U.S. 574, 578, 80 Sup. Ct. 1347, 1351, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1409, 1415 (1960), 
to the effect that "arbitration of labor disputes under collective agreements is part 
and parcel of the collective bargaining process itself," and then adds its own com-
ment that "an intention of the parties to lose the substance of the dispute in the 
form of the reference would be inconsistent with the underlying purpose of that 
process." Query whether a party to an arbitration proceeding may not attempt to 
get the opposing party to agree to a wording of the issue favorable to its casel 
6 G.L., c. 150C. Query as to the application of this statute to companies in inter-
state commerce in the light of the requirement that states apply federal law in Sec-
tion 301 suits. Perhaps its procedural provisions would still be applicable in any 
event. 
§14.7. 1 1962 Mass. Adv. Sh. 815, 182 N.E.2d 293. 
2 Citing Sturdevant Unemployment Compensation Case, 158 Pa. Super. 548, 557, 
45 A.2d 898, 903 (1946). 
§14.8. 1343 Mass. 207,178 N.E.2d 85 (1961). 
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which had been assented to by counsel for all parties. The review 
was sought on the grounds that the anti-injunction act had not been 
complied with. The lower court had found that no labor dispute 
existed. 
In Whitaker v. Boston and Maine Railroad,2 an employee brought 
suit on February 5, 1958, for "wrongful reduction in work on an em-
ployment roster on April 9, 1949." The defendant's demurrer was 
sustained, and the Court affirmed since "the plaintiff's laches are ap-
parent on the face of the bill" and the demurrer was good on this 
ground without reaching other issues. 
Two other cases involved both labor aspects and other issues. Hall-
Omar Baking Co. v. Commissioner of Labor and Industries8 held the 
"hawkers and peddlers" statute4 unconstitutional as applied to a re-
tailer of bakery products operating with route drivers in view of the 
provision in the statute for exemption of milk companies and the sale 
of dairy products. Weinstein v. Chief of Police of Fall River5 held 
that the denial of a Sunday license to an orthodox Jew who closed his 
business on Saturday raised no actionable issue or constitutional ques-
tion since the chief of police has discretion in the granting of Sunday 
licenses. 
§14.9. Discharge for jury duty. A Superior Court decision of in-
terest to the labor law bar held that the discharge of an employee 
while serving on the jury was contempt of court in violation of Sec-
tion 14A of Chapter 268 of the General Laws.1 The employee in-
volved was discharged for failing to report for work from 7:30 A.M. 
to 9: 15 A.M. while on jury duty. The Superior Court stressed the 
unreasonableness of the employer:! but also expressed the view that 
no non·jury assignment may be given to the employee by the employer 
under penalty of discharge regardless of the reasonableness of the as-
signment.a 
2343 Mass. 684, 180 N.E.2d 454 (1962). 
81962 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1203, 184 N.E.2d 344. See further comments on this case 
in §§10.5 supra and 18.56 infra. 
4 G.L., c. 101. 
1\ 1962 Mass. Adv. Sh. 751, 182 N.E.2d 525. 
§14.9. 1 Commonwealth v. Allan W. Bath and John Bath &: Co., Worcester Su-
perior Court, Nos. 143793 and 143794. Opinion dated May 7, 1962. The company 
was fined $3000, and the individual defendant, who was vice-president of the com-
pany, was fined $500. 
2 The employee's job was of an unusually dirty nature, and the employer did not 
provide adequate washing and bathing facilities. The Court noted "the time ele-
ments involved, the distances, the lack of bathing facilities." 
a The opinion stated: "This Court is compelled to say that jurors in their term of 
service must be entirely free of compulsory non-jury assignments, under threat of 
discharge, from their regular employer. 
"It is my view that any such non-jury assignment from an employer under pen-
alty of discharge, however reasonable it may appear, might interfere with the juror's 
availability for service, or with his peace of mind, with a consequent deleterious 
effect upon the system of administration of justice. 
"In short this Court adopts the view that a juror is a juror twenty-four hours 
11
Kearns: Chapter 14: Labor Relations
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1962
182 1962 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §14.l0 
C. MASSACHUSETTS LEGISLATION 
§14.10. Employees of certain public authorities. A significant 
statute was passed in the summer of 1962 governing the labor relations 
of four public authorities, the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority, the 
Massachusetts Port Authority, the Massachusetts Parking Authority 
and the Woods Hole, Martha's Vineyard and Nantucket Steamship 
Authority.! The brief new law (1) authorizes these authorities to bar-
gain collectively with unions representing their employees and to enter 
collective bargaining agreements with such unions; (2) requires the em-
ployees to submit all grievances and disputes to arbitration; (3) in effect, 
denies these employees the right to strike;2 and (4) makes Sections 4 
through 8 of the State Labor Relations LawS "so far as apt" applicable 
to such authorities and their employees. 
Among the unanswered questions which this statute raises are 
whether a closed shop or union shop requiring employees of the 
authorities to be or become union members is valid,4 and whether the 
enforcement procedures of a Superior Court decree requiring com-
pliance with an order of the Labor Relations Commission against the 
authorities, under penalty of contempt, would be "apt." Difficult 
legal problems arise when an instrumentality of government is given 
a hybrid character, being treated in some respect as a private organiza-
tion and in other aspects as a public agency. 
The new law was passed 1\ after the Supreme Judicial Court's deci~ 
sion in the MT A case6 and did not make the four authorities subject 
to the anti-injunction law. 
each day during his tenn of service and any requirement by an employer under 
threat of discharge which derogates from this principle would (upon discharge for 
failure of compliance) be violative of this statute." 
§14:.l0. 1 Acts of 1962, c. 760. 
2 The act provides: "Nothing in this act shall be construed as conferring upon the 
employees of any of said authorities the right to strike." Section 9 of the State Labor 
Relations Law (G.L.. c. 150A). recognizing the right of employees to strike. and Sec-
tion 3. recognizing the right to engage in concerted activities, are not made ap-
plicable to these authorities. The legislation also acted with knowledge of the Han-
sen case (see discussion in §14.5 supra). in which the Supreme Judicial Court stated 
that the mandatory arbitration provision in the statute creating the MT A "in effect 
prohibits strikes." 
S These provisions include employer and union unfair labor practices, determina-
tion of representation questions and the holding of elections, and procedural mat· 
ters. Although Section 3, which is the heart of the Labor Relations Act since it 
states the basic right of employees to organize and bargain collectively. is not made 
applicable to the authorities (presumably because it also contains the right to en-
gage in concerted activities which would include a strike), Section 4(1) makes it an 
unfair labor practice "to interfere with. restrain or coerce employees in the exercise 
of rights guaranteed in section three." (Emphasis supplied.) 
4 See Annotation. 31 A.L.R.2d 1142. 1161, §12. 1172. §20 (1953). 
II July 26, 1962. 
8 April 20, 1962. The Hansen case is discussed at §14.5 supra. 
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§14.11. Imported labor replacements. The 1960 statute regulat-
ing the importation of labor replacements or "strikebreakers" in labor 
disputes1 was amended to prohibit completely such importation by 
persons other than the employer directly involved.2 The registration, 
reporting and other provisions of the 1960 act continue as to employers 
directly involved in the dispute.s 
§14.12. Minimum wage and overtime. The Massachusetts mini-
mum wage was increased from $1 per hour to $1.15 per hour effective 
May 24, 1962, and will become $1.25 per hour September 5, 1963.1 
The overtime provisions were amended to exempt summer camps 
operated by a non-profit charitable corporation;2 the overtime exemp-
tion for seasonal businesses was reworded.s As noted in the 1961 
ANNUAL SURVEy,4 when the overtime law was enacted in 1960 the pen-
alty for violating the minimum wage provisions was not made applica-
ble to violation of the overtime provisions. This was remedied by the 
1962 legislature, which enacted a new penalty section specifically ap-
plicable to violation of the overtime provisions. Ii There were also 
several minor administrative and clarifying amendments to Chapter 
150.6 
§14.13. Miscellaneous legislation. A considerable number of 
changes in laws affecting some aspect of labor relations were made in 
the 1962 session of the legislature. Firefighters were prohibited from 
performing the duties of police officers, or any duties other than those 
regularly performed, in connection with any labor dispute.1 A pen-
alty, in the form of a $200 fine, applicable to "whomever violates" any 
provision thereof, was added to the 1958 law recognizing the right of 
public employees to form and join unions and present proposals.2 
§14.l1. 1 G.L .• c. 150D. added by Acts of 1960. c. 738. See 1961 Ann. Surv. Mass. 
Law §13.l6. 
2 Acts of 1962. c. 443. 
8 Some question may exist as to the applicability of Chapter 150D to employers 
in interstate commerce under the federal pre-emption doctrine on the grounds that 
federal law grants an employer the right to replace economic strikers. and the state 
act attempts to regulate that right. Those supporting applicability of the act in 
such circumstances would presumably argue that it is within the exception per-
mitting state action to control violence in labor disputes and pointing to the dec-
laration of policy in the state act that employment of nonresidents as strikebreakers 
tends to produce violence. 
§14.l2. 1 Acts of 1962. cc. 134. 399. 
2 Id .• c. 153. 
8 Id .• c. 155. 
41961 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §13.18. 
Ii Acts of 1962. c. 371. Penalties are: fine of $50-$250; imprisonment. 10-90 days; 
each week and each employee constitutes separate offense; employees may recover 
unpaid overtime plus costs and reasonable attorney's fees in a civil action; and. upon 
request. the Commissioner of Labor and Industries may collect for the employee. 
6 Acts of 1962. cc. 363. 479. 
§14.13. 1 Acts of 1962. c. 760. 
2 Id .• c. 504. See the comment in 1958 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §15.4 as to the ques-
tion of enforcement of the 1958 statute. 
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Amendments were made to the various statutes regulating electricians,s 
plumbers,4 gas fitters,1i firemen and engineers,6 architects7 and hawk-
ers and peddlers.s The statutory provision prohibiting completely 
certain types of industrial homework was amended to include within 
the prohibition, work on outergarments and undergarments.1l The 
definition of "buildings used for industrial purposes" or "industrial 
establishments" in Chapter 149 was expanded.10 
Those obtaining school bus contracts in cities or towns with a popu-
lation of 16,000 or over will hereafter be required to pay wage rates as 
determined by the Commissioner of Labor and Industries which "shall 
not be less than those established by collective agreements or under-
standings between organized labor and employers" for bus operators 
in the city or town involved.11 In another change, the former provi-
sion in Chapter 149 for a fine of $100 for violation of "any reasonable 
rule, regulation or requirement" of the Department of Labor and In-
dustries was amended by increasing the fine to $250 and striking out 
the word "reasonable." 12 There were several minor amendments to 
the laws relating to the employment of children,ls one to the anti-
discrimination law14 and three to the Employment Security Law.15 
The authorization to the Commissioner of Labor and Industries to 
suspend the operation of certain labor laws was again extended for 
another year .16 
3 Acts of 1962. c. 582. 
4 Id .• c. 488. 
Ii Id .• c. 623. 
6 Id .• cc. 27. 574. 
7 Id .• c. 94. 
8 Id .• c. 541. 
DId .• c. 253. 
1(1 Id .• c. 102. 
11 Id .• c. 729. 
12 Id .• c. 712. 
13 Id .• cc. 60. 107. 
HId .• c. 627. 
111 Id .• cc. 414. 468. 476. 
16 Id .• c. 26. 
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